Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

4-1-2009

Historical American Perspectives on International Law
Harlan G. Cohen
University of Georgia, hcohen@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Harlan G. Cohen, Historical American Perspectives on International Law , 15 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 485
(2009),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/930

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
SCHOOL OF LAW
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
Paper No. 09-05

April 2009

Historical American Perspectives on International Law
HARLAN GRANT COHEN

Assistant Professor
University of Georgia School of Law
hcohen@uga.edu

Forthcoming in
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law,
Vol. 15 (2009)
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network electronic library at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393923

HISTORICAL AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Harlan Grant Cohen∗

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................1
MISSING PIECES ................................................................................3
BEYOND CARICATURE ......................................................................9
CONSTRUCTION ZONE .....................................................................12
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................15

I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this year’s International Law Weekend, “The United
States and International Law: Legal Traditions and Future Possibilities,”
cries out for additional historical perspective. This may, at least initially,
sound like a surprising claim. Conversations about the relationship between
the United States and International Law seem saturated with history.
Advocates of American participation in the International Criminal Court and
opponents of Bush Administration tactics in the war on terror both harken
back to American sponsorship of the Nuremberg tribunals to support their
views. The names of obscure World War II-era cases like Quirin,1
Eisentrager,2 and Hirota3 roll off the tongues of lawyers debating the Bush
Administration’s tactics in the war on terror. More generally, foreign affairs
law and foreign affairs law scholars often seemed obsessed with history—
even compared to constitutional law scholars. We pour over 19th century
prize cases,4 long-forgotten international incidents,5 and long-lost treatises
∗
Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D., New York University
School of Law 2003; M.A. History, Yale University 2000; B.A., Yale University 1998.
Thank you to organizers of International Law Weekend and to my fellow panel members,
Elizabeth Borgwardt, John Witt, Dan Hulsebosch, and David Golove, for the opportunity to
put this panel together.
1
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
2
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
3
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949).
4
See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64 (1804); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 101-02 (1825);
5
See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, ‘De Facto Sovereignty’: Boumediene and Beyond
(forthcoming George Washington Law Review) (discussing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S.
202 (1890), a case concerning jurisdiction over murder committed on a disputed guano
island).
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on the law of war.6 We bandy around the names of long-dead scholars like
Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek as if they were close personal friends.
Even foreign affairs law doctrine gives history a role, recognizing the force
of longstanding political branch practice.7
And yet, the work of the four scholars on this panel—Elizabeth
Borgwardt, Associate Professor of History at Washington University in St.
Louis, John Fabian Witt, Professor of Law and History at Columbia Law
School, David Golove, Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law at New
York University School of Law, and Daniel Hulsebosch, Professor at New
York University School of Law—highlight how little we really know about
the history of American perspectives on international law. Largely lost
amongst the history of American diplomacy and warcraft, foreign affairs
caselaw and doctrinal development is the rich cultural and intellectual
history of American engagement with international law and justice. What is
international law? Is it a progressive tool to achieve American goals and
ideals, a means of negotiating cooperative solutions to transnational
problems, or an illegitimate foreign attempt to constrain U.S. power?
Different Americans, at different times, have held these and other more
complex views of international law. Debates between these views have had
major impact on the shape of international institutions and American
engagement with them. Yet very little of this is captured by the more
traditional legal histories.
American conceptions of international justice and ideas of American
mission have long helped shape international law and institutions.
Conceptions of American national identity, in turn, have been deeply
influenced by international law and by American perceptions of it, both
positive and negative. This history of ideas begins to bring the dynamic
relationship between the United States and International Law, its history and
its potential future, truly into focus. These scholars, along with others, have
begun to explore the history of these ideas. There is much more to be done.
This short discussion describes some of the real, powerful
contributions this new type of historical scholarship can make to our
understanding of American relations with international law and the rest of
the world. In particular, it focuses on three specific contributions: enriching
6
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-609 (2006) (quoting extensively from
“The classic treatise penned by Colonel William Winthrop, whom we have called ‘the
‘Blackstone of Military Law,’’” (internal citation omitted)).
7
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring) (“In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
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and improving our historical picture of American relations to international
law, complicating the common stereotypes of that relationship that dominate
current debates, and facilitating study of various theories of international
law, particularly constructivist ones. It also serves as a call for more
scholarship in the area.8
II. MISSING PIECES
Scholarship on American ideas about international law and justice
seeks to fill a major gap in the legal literature. Despite voluminous
scholarship on the history of the United States and international law, the
intellectual history of American perceptions of, engagement with, and
contributions to international law remain amazingly underdeveloped.
The grand majority of legal-history scholarship on the United States
and international law focuses on the history of U.S. Foreign Affairs law.9
This scholarship tends to focus on one of two sets of questions. The first is
how various Constitutional provisions that concern foreign affairs, e.g., the
treaty clause,10 the declare war clause,11 the foreign commerce clause,12 the
define-and-punish clause,13 the ambassador clauses,14 have historically been
interpreted and how those clauses incorporate, ignore, or otherwise respond
to international law.
The second set explores questions typical of
diplomatic history, asking how various American leaders have interpreted,
followed, or violated international law in their practice of foreign affairs and
war.15 The importance of both sets of questions has only been enhanced by
recent events and controversies—the fight against global terror has raised
difficult constitutional and international law questions—and nothing in this
discussion should be understood as diminishing the importance of this work
in any way.

8

For more discussion of some of these issues, see Harlan Grant Cohen, The American
Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 551
(2003).
9
This is to be contrasted with more strictly historical scholarship, in which the intellectual
and cultural history of American foreign policy has been extensively explored. Scholars of
international and American foreign affairs law would be well-served to engage with this
historical work.
10
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
14
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
15
As a note, one result of this focus on U.S. Foreign Affairs law is that American views of
international law are rarely placed in the context of scholarship on international law history
rather than scholarship on American history.
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But read alone, these histories present a distorted and potentially
dangerous picture of American perspectives on international law. One
problem with the focus of these histories is that it tends to encourage a
picture of the United States and international law as in opposition, as two
distinct entities eyeballing each other across a rift (to some, that rift might
look like the Atlantic Ocean), sometimes embracing, sometimes ignoring
each other, sometimes in conflict. In these histories, the Constitution’s text
treats international law in some way; American leaders choose to follow or
not follow international law’s precepts. Such a distinction between the two
is clearly overdrawn. International law is not an entity, but an idea, or set of
ideas. While some Americans at some times may have been opposed to
those ideas, others have believed deeply in them, and still others have
helped shape them. It is strange to talk about the United States, as a state, as
having any kind of distinct relationship with them. But this oppositional
view, even if misperceived, can be quite dangerous, lending support to some
commonly-held views about American exceptionalism, a concern that will
be discussed in the next section.
These sorts of histories also tend to overemphasize a particular
conception of international law: international law as a body of rules either
to be observed or violated, an “International Law” in quotation marks. In
these histories, the question is usually how a particular rule of international
law is treated, either by the constitutional text or by American leaders.
Although international law can be described, at any given point, as a
collection of rules on particular subjects, at least historically, international
law has been much more than just a set of blackletter rules (if anything
blackletter rules often seen maddeningly missing). A broader, better
understanding of international law would place those rules in their larger
context, as part of a constantly evolving set of ideas and normative
commitments about international relations, justice, and governance. To
truly understand the complex relationship between Americans and
international law, one must look not only at legal developments, but at
discussions of American mission and Manifest Destiny, anti-slave trade
movements,16 immigrant anti-colonialism,17 the international peace
movement,18 Jacksonian isolationism,19 and the development of various
American foreign policies from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilsonianism to
16

See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human
Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550 (2008).
17
See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, SPECIAL SORROWS: THE DIASPORIC IMAGINATION
OF IRISH, POLISH, AND JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1995).
18
See John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American
Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 729-33 (2004).
19
See Walter Russell Mead, The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy, 58
NAT’L INTEREST 5-29 (Winter 1999/2000).
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Containment. Many of these ideas are only tangentially related to specific
international law rules. Often, those who developed, held, and discussed
these ideas did so in non-legal language, citing religious imperatives,
international morality, global justice, or realpolitik.20 Nonetheless, these
ideas have consistently shaped American perceptions of international law
and have informed various Americans in their attempts to reform the
international system, develop new rules of international law, and create new
international institutions. Understanding the diverse positions the United
States has taken toward international law in the past, e.g., support for the
creation of the United Nations and the Nuremberg Tribunal but opposition
to the League of Nations and the International Criminal Court, requires a
fuller understanding of how each of those institutions either resonated or
was in tension with other ideological commitments of particular groups of
Americans. Predicting the positions future American administrations might
take on international law and institutions requires a deeper understanding of
international law’s place within competing foreign policy ideas and
philosophies.
But more important than its narrowness and inaccuracy is the ability
of this description of international law to distort our understanding of
American perceptions of international law over time. If international law is
perceived as no more than a body of specific laws, then the relationship
between the United States and international law can take one of only two
forms, compliance or non-compliance. And of course, not surprisingly, the
traditional histories focus on specific moments when the choice had to be
made between compliance and non-compliance. But it is difficult to
extrapolate more durable U.S. positions on international law from these
moments of crisis.21 First, violations of international law are almost
certainly overrepresented in these histories. By definition, these moments
are ones where possible violation of the rule has been placed on the table for
consideration.
Missing are more general patterns of compliance.
International law might be most successful when its precepts are so deeply
internalized by international actors as to make the question of compliance or
non-compliance unthinkable—the question is simply taken off the table. As
a result though, true compliance may mean no discussion of the rule at all;
most compliance may thus be invisible to history (or at least difficult to
discern). Second, these moments of crisis present the most powerful
possible reasons for violating an international law rule, most notably,

20

See Cohen, supra note 8, at 556-60.
Cf David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where it Is, 34 GA. J. INT’L
COMP. L. 333, 348-50 (2006) (making a similar point about the case studies used in JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2005)).
21
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national survival.22 It is unremarkable to find that legal rules (any legal
rules) will be under the most strain during these moments; as a result,
moments of crisis tell us little about the more ordinary perceptions of the
rule. Even the most human rights respecting states have committed horrible
acts in defense of national security.23 Most of all, moments of compliance
or noncompliance fail to capture the complex processes by which the rules
and institutions of international law are created, debated, transformed, and
sustained. They fail to capture the complex role the United States and
Americans have had in helping to shape international law as well as the
ways those international law has influenced American national identity.
A number of scholars, including those on this panel, have begun to
remedy the situation, focusing less on historical conflicts over international
laws and more on the intellectual history of conceptions of international law.
Mark Janis, for example, has tracked the transfer of ideas about international
law from British scholars like Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham to American
scholars like Joseph Story, James Kent, and Henry Wheaton.24 He has also
explored the longstanding influence of American religion and religious
movements on American conceptions of international law and justice and
the lasting imprints those movements have made on the international law
rules passed down to today.25 Mary Dudziak has written about the complex
relationship between the global Cold War politics and the success of the
civil rights movement in the United States.26 And Jonathan Zasloff has
focused on the lawyer-statesmen, men like Elihu Root and Henry Stimson,
who dominated American foreign policy during the first half of the

22

Cf Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823, 1883–86 (2002) (noting that compliance may be less likely in situations involving
national security where the cost of compliance may seem higher than those of violation).
23
The United Kingdom, United States, France, and Israel, for example, have all been accused
of using torture to fight terrorism. See generally Ireland v. UK, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at ¶
96 (1976) (United Kingdom); Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and
Recommendations 13-14 (2006), available at http://
www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf (United States); El-Masri v. United States, 479
F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); BATTLE OF ALGIERS (Igor Film 1957) (France); HCJ
5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2) (Israel). Such torture
may be an inexcusable violation of international law, but its use may not be the best indicator
of each state’s full commitment to or perception of human rights law, let alone the
international rule of law more generally.
24
See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004).
25
Id.
26
See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002).
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twentieth century.27 Each brought their domestic legal training to their new
foreign policy roles and in the process, transmuted then-current ideas about
domestic law into American foreign policy.
Elizabeth Borgwardt, Daniel Hulsebosch, David Golove, and John
Fabian Witt are all engaged in similar projects. Elizabeth Borgwardt has
previously written about the role of domestic New Deal ideas in the shaping
of the post-World War II international system.28 In her retelling, the
Atlantic Charter and its four freedoms represented a New Deal manifesto for
the world, marrying civil and political rights (freedom of speech and
religion) to economic and social rights (freedom from want and fear).29
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his fellow New Dealers brought a positive,
pragmatic vision of the role government and institutions could play in
rebuilding and managing the world, and the experience of the Depression,
the New Deal, and World War II created the domestic base of support for
such actions that had been notably missing during the League of Nations
campaign following World War I.30 The postwar international machinery—
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, and the Nuremberg
tribunals—were the products of these American ideas and realities.31 Her
current project looks at the fate of those postwar institutions, particularly the
Nuremberg principles and the core human rights treaties. Here though, the
story changes from one of American influence on international law to one of
international law’s influence on the United States. Borgwardt’s new project,
“The Rise and Rise of the Nuremberg Principles: ‘Constitutionalizing’
Wartime Reconfigurations of Sovereignty,” seeks to explain the expanding
influence of human rights in the face of Cold War domestic opposition to
human rights treaties.32
David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch look at this kind of crossinfluence between American and international law ideas during an earlier
period. Their project, “The Status of the Law of Nations in the Early
American Republic,” places the U.S. Constitution and the early Republic

27
See generally Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The
Twenty Years’ Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583 (2004); Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping
of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239
(2003).
28
See generally ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA'S VISION
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
This summary is based on Elizabeth Borgwardt’s remarks on the “Historical American
Perspectives on International law” panel at International Law Weekend 2008, The American
Branch of the International Law Association, October 18, 2008.
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into its wider at Atlantic context.33 One aspect of the project is to explore
the foreign affairs role and impact of the Constitution. As they explain, one
key purpose of the Constitution was to establish the United States as an
independent member of the international community of states, capable of
self-governance, ready for diplomacy, and able to ratify and abide by
agreements. The Constitution was designed to impress potential allies and
trading partners.34 This experiment, in turn, had lasting effects on
international law, as other new states followed the constitution-writing path
to independence. At the same time, Golove and Hulsebosch explain, the
Constitution was itself deeply influenced by the law of nations. This second
aspect of their project traces the path of many international law ideas into
constitutional doctrine: The law of nations’ status as “higher” law was
transferred to the Constitution; ideas about judicial review first applied to
the law of nations were eventually applied to the Constitution.35
In an earlier project, John Witt focused on Crystal Eastman’s
transformation from American labor advocate to international peace activist
to civil libertarian and explored the internationalist origins of the American
civil rights movement.36 Witt described how turn-of-the-twentieth-century
Americans joined in the general fervor for international law and governance
that swept the world in the years surrounding the 1899 and 1904 Hague
Conventions, the establishment of the Permanent Court for International
Arbitration, and other positive developments in international governance.37
While some, like Elihu Root and the other founders of the American Society
of International Law, saw these developments as proof of the power of
international law as a means of mediating between states, Crystal Eastman
and other members of the international peace movement saw these
developments as the triumphs of cosmopolitanism.38 The international
peace movement they joined would link citizens of the world and vindicate
their rights against the tyranny of states.39 When World War I made
membership in the international peace movement politically unacceptable in
the United States, many of the movement’s former leaders refocused their
33

This summary is based on David Golove’s and Daniel Hulsebosch’s remarks on the
“Historical American Perspectives on International law” panel at International Law Weekend
2008, The American Branch of the International Law Association, October 18, 2008.
34
As well as to rectify the mistakes of the Articles of Confederation: state recalcitrance in
relation to treaties, foreign policy, and the law of nations was met with the Supremacy
Clause, federal court jurisdiction over treaties, ambassadors, etc., and the centralization of
foreign affairs authority in the federal government.
35
As an example of the former, Golove and Hulsebosch point specifically to Rutgers v.
Waddington (N.Y. Mayor’s Court, 1784).
36
See generally John Fabian Witt, supra note 18.
37
See id. at 725-30.
38
See id. at 730-33.
39
See id. at 731-33.
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efforts on domestic civil liberties, creating the organization that would
eventually become the American Civil Liberties Union.40
John Witt’s current project is similarly concerned with the ways
international law has helped shape American ideals and self-image.41 In
this project, Witt argues that since early in U.S. history, Americans have
been torn between two visions of the international law of war: an
enlightenment law of war that sought to regulate the conduct of war and
minimize humanitarian harm, and an earlier “just war” tradition that
legitimated actions based on the justice of either side’s cause. Both
traditions are at work in the Civil War-era Lieber Code, Witt argues. On the
one hand, the Code codified humanitarian rules applicable to all sides of the
conflict. On the other, it authorized some of the most brutal of Union tactics
during the final stages of the war. The tension between these two
impulses—one towards law and the other towards justice—survives to this
day, and it is the seeming conflict between them, Witt argues, that has
animated many of the most difficult debates over American war-fighting.
All four of these scholars are thus beginning to provide a fuller
history of the American relationship with international law and justice. The
cultural and intellectual history that emerges is far more complex than often
presumed. Americans and international law ideas have been deeply
influenced by each other and cannot be easily disentangled even when in
seeming opposition. The relationship between the United States and
international law cannot be understood solely in terms of legal rules,
compliance, and non-compliance. Instead, a deeper understanding of how
international law responds to American self-identity, American views of the
United States’ role in the world, and American conceptions of international
justice is required.
III. BEYOND CARICATURE
Popular discussions of the relationship between the United States
and international law often fall back on a few common but dangerous
memes about that relationship. History of the type described here can help
rectify and complicate these too quickly drawn caricatures.
There are a few different caricatures of American relations to
international law. The first involves a tendency towards presentism. This
caricature essentializes current perceptions of American relations to
international law—for example, the view that the Bush Administration
40

See id. at 746-50.
This summary is based on John Witt’s remarks on the “Historical American Perspectives
on International law” panel at International Law Weekend 2008, The American Branch of the
International Law Association, October 18, 2008.

41
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opposes international law—and projects it back into the past, creating an
almost inevitable chain from the founding of the Republic to today.42
Depending on who’s telling the story and when, this presentism lends itself
to a overly simplified and sometimes dangerous pictures of the United States
as longstanding “champion” of international law,43 or constant defender of
American rather than European or international values, or eternal opponent
of international governance.
Whereas this first caricature essentializes the present, two other
caricatures essentialize apparent aspects of American identity or thinking.
The latter two are thus essentially versions of American exceptionalism.
One might be described as a normative exceptionalism. Versions of this
caricature emphasize the founders’ desire to break with the ways of the old
world—to be a “city on a hill.”44 According to this caricature, the United
States holds and has held different values from other parts of the world.
These values might include different (or in some views, greater)
commitments to democracy, or liberty, or individualism.45 One recent
42

See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 Am U. L. Rev. 553,
589 (2007) (“Contemporary negative reactions to the use of comparative constitutional
precedent tap into a longstanding tradition of exceptionalism and particularism in American
attitudes toward foreign law.); Edward Lazarus, A “Moral” Foreign Policy That Ignores
International Law?: The History and Ironies of the U.S.'s Current View of Its Role In the
World, Findlaw’s Writ, Thursday, May 01, 2003, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030501.html (“The recent surge of moral thinking in
U.S. foreign policy has longstanding roots in our national history and spirit—and indeed, in
world history. It's likely to be a feature of U.S. policy for a long time.”).
43
See, e.g., Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2053 (“[T]he United
States has a longstanding presence in international human rights treaty negotiations and has
made significant contributions to the contours of human rights practice, policy, and action
worldwide.”); id. at 2054 (“The longstanding nature of the relationship between the United
States and the United Nations has built a deep reservoir of shared human rights
commitment.”); Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights
Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1993) (“Uncorrected derogation
thus may prompt serious and continuing international opprobrium at the same time as it
undermines our standing as a longstanding champion of human rights.”).
44
John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill (1630), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 7 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 1989); George Washington, Farewell Address
(1796), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 76 (Thomas G.
Patterson ed., 1989) (“Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation.”); see also Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law
Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International
Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2000) (“America’s relationship to the rest of the world still
seems to us to be one of example: the ‘city on a hill’ that the rest of the world is to imitate”).
45
Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008
(“‘It’s American exceptionalism,’ Professor [Eric] Posner added in an interview. ‘The view
going back 200 years is that we’ve figured it out and people should follow our lead.’”);
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American
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example argues that Americans are constitutionalists, viewing popular
sovereignty as the most legitimate source of law, while Europeans are
universalists, looking beyond democracy to universal fundamental rights.46
The second form of exceptionalism, by contrast, is almost antinormative. This caricature describes the United States as a holdout from
international law and institutions, a state only willing to abide by
international law to the extent it suits its interests. This view explains the
different views that the United States has had of international law—support
for the creation of the United Nations, but apparent contempt for it now,
sponsorship of the Nuremberg tribunal but opposition to the International
Criminal Court, support for the WTO but opposition to Kyoto—as no more
than naked power politics and blatant hypocrisy.47
Most international law scholars know that these caricatures are
overdrawn and are usually careful to couch them in those terms.
Nonetheless, these memes can be quite powerful and pervasive, particularly
in more informal settings. These caricatures are also quite dangerous,
suggesting an inevitability in American views of international law that can
make progress difficult. Normative exceptionalism becomes a defense
against calls for cooperation or compliance; an American tradition of
pragmatism (or hypocrisy) becomes an excuse in itself for unilateralism.
Belief in longstanding American support for international law obscures the
real concerns of international law’s opponents and the equally long tradition
of isolationism. Those holding this view may also fail to recognize the
importance of American violations, as each is swept aside as a mere
exception to the general rule of compliance.48 None of these caricatures
encourage the engagement with ideas necessary to move past disagreements
and to find common ground.
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1335, 1378 (“Like it or not, Americans really are a special people with a special
ideology that sets us apart from all the other peoples of the Old and New Worlds.”).
46
See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971
(2004). See also ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 3 (2003) (“It is time to stop
pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world…Americans
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”).
47
See, e.g., Moisés Naím, Missing Links: The Hypocrisy Audit, FOREIGN POL’Y
(September/October 2008) (“Double standards have always been a part of U.S. foreign
policy.”); JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1
(2004) (“The United State is in fact still leading the world on human rights, but in the wrong
direction, promoting short-term instrumentalism over long-term ethical dealing, double
standards instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature over a more open one.”).
Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 20 (4th ed. 2006) (“Hypocrisy is rife in
wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear in the right.”).
48
More cynically, the notion that the United States is a longstanding supporter of
international law can become a shield against rightful criticism of U.S. actions. Each
violation is justified by its exceptional nature.
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The type of history discussed here provides an antidote to these
common caricatures. Far from essentializing the present or certain
American values, these projects unearth a series of counter-stories of how
different Americans, at different times, translated ideas about American
values into very different views on international law and international
justice. Early leaders of the Republic turn to international law to protect the
country’s independence.49 New Dealers translate their ideas about domestic
justice into the Atlantic Charter and postwar international institutions,50 but
Cold War Americans retreat from international agreements they fear might
be used to undermine their values.51 Early twentieth century rights
advocates first look outside the U.S., to world citizenship, as a protection
against governmental abuse, but eventually discover the values they hold
dear in American civil liberties.52 And Americans beset by war are torn
between the justice of their cause and their commitment to the law of war.53
Moreover, although each of these scholars tells stories that are
uniquely about the United States—the ways domestic politics and domestic
political ideologies have shaped American views of international law—
theirs is at the most a very different type of exceptionalism. The Americans
they describe do see international law through the lens of their own history,
culture, and national ideology, but that history, culture, and national
ideology are often the product of international law ideas as well. Far from
placing the United States outside of international law, choosing how to deal
with it, these scholars tell a story of interaction and cross-fertilization, in
which the seams between international and domestic ideas quickly
disintegrate. In this sense, the American exceptionalism they describe is one
the United States shares with other international actors, each of whom
brings its own views of history to these problems. The United States they
describe is part of the project of international law (even when seemingly
opposed to it), not exempt from or outside of it.
IV. CONSTRUCTION ZONE
The type of historical project pursued by these scholars can also
contribute to our understanding of how and when states comply with
international law. These projects provide information useful in exploring
various theories of compliance, including three of the most popular:
rationalism, liberalism, and constructivism. Of all those theories, however,
constructivism may be benefitted most of all.
49

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-26 and accompanying text.
51
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
52
See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
53
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
50
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Of each of these theories of compliance, rationalism may seem to
have the least to gain from these sorts of historical studies. Rationalist
theories (there are multiple flavors with important differences) apply game
theory and economic analysis to explain and predict when self-interested
states54 will choose cooperation through international law and international
institutions.55 The traditional histories of U.S. foreign affairs law might
seem like the perfect fodder for these sorts of theories. Focusing on the
decisions between compliance and non-compliance, between joining treaties
and spurning them, these histories would seem to provide the perfect cases
for testing and honing rationalist predictions.56 As David Golove has
pointed out, however, without a better understanding of historical context,
rationalists might misidentify the actual choices made and might
misconstrue cooperation as non-compliance.57 A dispute between two
states, ripped from its larger context, may look to a rationalist like an
international law failure. At times, however, historical context may
minimize the dispute, revealing the incident as a good faith argument over
how to apply a rule to which both states are committed.58 The dispute itself
may be the proof and product of a longer cooperative relationship.59 Proper
rationalist modeling thus requires a fuller understanding of American
engagement with that rule and that state.
The role these cultural and intellectual histories can play with regard
to liberal international theory is far more obvious. Liberal international
theory “opens the black box of the state and considers the role of substate
actors.”60 Liberalism suggests that “state interests are best understood as an
aggregation and intermediation of individual interests. Sources of power
54

As one rationalist theorist puts it: “States are assumed to be rational, self-interested, and
able to identify and pursue their interests…. States do not concern themselves with the
welfare of other states but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs.” ANDREW T.
GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008).
55
See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 64, 79 (2006) (“Political scientists began using rationalism to identify means by
which international law could facilitate cooperation that would otherwise not occur. Some
early work showed how simple games could be used as metaphors for the kinds of
cooperation problems that could be solved by international organizations and international
law.”).
56
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-82
(2005).
57
Golove, supra note 21, at 350, 376.
58
See id. at 375 (“[A] fuller understanding of the circumstances reveals that the United States
had many compelling reasons to alter its position on these legal questions and that the
opposite claim—that the United States was fully justified in changing its position is at least
equally plausible.”).
59
See id. at 350-76 (discussing dispute over neutral shipping rules during the American Civil
War).
60
Guzman, supra note 54, at 18.
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and interests are found within and between states. International law is driven
from the bottom up.”61 These histories, drawing the linkages between
mercantile interests and the Constitution,62 domestic rights advocates and
the international peace movement,63 New Dealers and the United Nations,64
can help liberal theorists to explore the mechanisms through which domestic
interests lead to international action.
But it is constructivism that stands to benefit the most from these
types of history. Constructivist theories of international law suggest that
state interests and state identity are not constant but are instead
“constructed” through legal rules, interaction with other states, and the
activities of individuals and advocacy groups. “Constructivism asks how
norms evolve and how identities are constituted, analyzing, among other
things, the role of identity in shaping political action and the mutually
constitutive relationship between agents and structures.”65 “International
law may be understood as both a reflection of identities and interests of the
powerful, and as a social artifact that reinforces identities, interests, and
power.”66 Constructivism thus dovetails well with the intellectual and
cultural histories here. Like these histories, it seeks to trace the origins of
particular international and domestic ideas, to understand how Americans
came to perceive international law in particular ways and how particular
international law rules and ideas have helped shape American interests and
identity. Both these histories and constructivist theory explore the
mechanisms through which ideas are transferred between individuals, states,
and the international system, when ideas will be accepted and assimilated
and when they will be opposed.
One difficulty in studying international law from a constructivist
point of view is that developments in international law and perceptions of
international norms may be overdetermined. At least with relatively
contemporary events, it may be very difficult to isolate the real reasons why
perceptions of international law rules change.67 There are too many actors
and too many variables. Here, these cultural and intellectual histories can
help. The passage of time may help clarify the mechanisms involved; the
61

Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 81.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
63
See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
64
See supra notes 28-26 and accompanying text.
65
Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review: Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1411 (2006).
66
Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 82.
67
Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of
International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 767 (2006) (“Constructivism may
tell us something about global processes and interactions at a macro level, but to the critics
offers little help in predicting how a norm shift—for example from toleration of the death
penalty to abolition—will take place.”).
62
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relative importance of different events and individuals may emerge—as
each of these histories suggest.
But the main concern with constructivist approaches is that they
yield few of the comprehensive models or predictions that are normally the
hallmark of social science theories.68 The theory’s embrace of complexity,
something it shares with history, makes prediction difficult. Although a
number of constructivist theories have been advanced, it is difficult to
imagine a comprehensive model of norm change that can predict with
precision the different positions states will take with regard to international
law.69 But the similarities between constructivism and history suggest that
the criticism is ill-placed. History too yields few predictive models, but is
rarely criticized for that fact. 70 We simply understand that the historical
inquiry is different from that in the social sciences, one more concerned with
explaining and understanding than with simplifying and predicting. Putting
aside for the moment the potential emergence of a comprehensive
constructivist model of state behavior, constructivists may be best served by
allying themselves more closely with cultural and intellectual historians like
those on this panel. Historians are already experts in constructivist-like
inquiries, drawing narratives of causation and influence out of seemingly
incoherent, impossibly complex snapshots of history and weighing the
importance of individuals and moments. Together with constructivist
theorists of international law, they can work to try to understand the
complex history of international law ideas and the complex ways in which
they have interacted with American domestic politics and self-identity.
V. CONCLUSION
This panel highlights some of the cutting edge historical work being
done on the intellectual and cultural history of American perspectives on
international law. Hopefully, it can also serve as a call to arms for other
scholars of international and American foreign affairs law, demonstrating
the real value of engagement with this sort of history.

68
Id. (“The central critique of constructivism is that it is insufficiently concrete or specific,
and thus fails to provide an effective framework through which to make causal predictions of
state behavior and/or to design a blueprint for regimes or strategies for addressing human
rights violations.”).
69
See Guzman, supra note 54, at 20 (“[T]his flexibility makes it difficult for constructivism
to produce a general and tractable theory of state behavior.”).
70
Though partisans of social science have at times been known to do so.
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